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Contribution	  to	  the	  ASEN	  Debate	  on	  Joep	  Leerssen’s	  	  National	  
Thought	  in	  Europe:	  A	  Cultural	  History	  
Nations	  and	  Nationalism	  19(3):	  411-­16.	  
Jonathan	  Hearn	  
University	  of	  Edinburgh	  
	  
Let	  me	  first	  say	  I	  read	  Joep	  Leerssen’s	  National	  Thought	  in	  Europe	  with	  great	  pleasure	  and	  sympathy,	  finding	  it	  a	  wonderfully	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  slow	  ideological	  evolution	  of	  ideas	  of	  national	  character	  or	  ‘ethnotypes’	  as	  he	  calls	  them.	  	  It	  included	  many	  narrative	  by-­‐ways	  in	  its	  account	  that	  were	  either	  new	  to	  me,	  or	  much	  more	  subtly	  developed	  than	  I	  had	  encountered	  before.	  	  Particularly	  interesting	  were	  some	  of	  the	  root	  sources	  of	  ethnotyping	  practice	  that	  Leerssen	  identifies.	  	  First,	  I	  was	  fascinated	  by	  the	  way	  he	  traces	  the	  impulse	  toward	  cultural	  categorisation	  back	  to	  medieval	  distinctions	  between	  the	  civilised,	  socially-­‐controlled	  	  ‘urb’,	  and	  the	  wild	  and	  dangerous	  hinterland.	  	  Secondly,	  his	  identification	  of	  Tacitus	  and	  his	  recovery	  during	  the	  Renaissance	  as	  a	  key	  source	  for	  the	  rhetorical	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  virtuous	  primitive	  and	  the	  degeneracy	  of	  the	  over-­‐civilised,	  prefiguring	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  noble	  savage,	  was	  very	  illuminating.	  And	  thirdly,	  I	  was	  very	  intrigued	  by	  his	  identification	  of	  the	  role	  of	  early	  modern	  drama	  in	  the	  formulation	  and	  stabalisation	  of	  stereotypes	  of	  national	  character,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  playwright’s	  craft	  of	  working	  within	  dramatic	  conventions.	  	  These	  observations	  and	  many	  others	  made	  the	  book	  rich	  in	  insights	  and	  a	  pleasure	  to	  read.	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As	  the	  narrative	  advances	  these	  feed	  into	  more	  familiar	  (to	  me)	  themes	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  nationalist	  thought	  in	  Europe.	  	  These	  include:	  ideas	  of	  geographical	  and	  climatological	  determinism	  in	  the	  17th	  century	  (e.g.	  Montesquieu);	  notions	  of	  patriotism	  and	  demos	  in	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  revolutions	  of	  the	  18th	  century;	  the	  German-­‐cum-­‐romantic	  reaction	  to	  French	  cultural	  domination	  and	  conquest;	  and	  finally	  the	  great	  nation-­‐state	  building	  projects	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  and	  their	  violent	  convergence	  in	  two	  World	  Wars	  in	  the	  20th	  	  century.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  book,	  in	  a	  more	  prescriptive	  vein,	  our	  contemporary	  world	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  reconstitution	  of	  former	  soviet	  states	  in	  eastern	  Europe,	  new	  migrations	  of	  peoples,	  and	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  demonisation	  of	  Islam,	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  battleground	  between	  continuing	  cultural	  essentialism	  and	  more	  promising	  impulses	  towards	  something	  like	  Habermas’s	  civic,	  ‘constitutional	  patriotism’.	  
It	  is	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  challenge	  to	  set	  out	  a	  debate	  when	  one	  finds	  so	  much	  to	  enjoy	  and	  agree	  with.	  	  But	  one	  always	  finds	  in	  such	  well-­‐elaborated	  accounts	  conceptualisations	  and	  arguments	  that	  could	  be	  approached	  differently,	  viewed	  from	  a	  different	  angle.	  	  I	  will	  try	  to	  do	  this.	  	  Whether	  that	  will	  result	  in	  ‘debate’	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense,	  or	  simply	  a	  diversified	  view	  on	  the	  subject,	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  pay	  some	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘ethnotypes’,	  so	  I	  will	  try	  to	  anchor	  my	  comments	  to	  that	  concept.	  	  It	  seems	  best	  to	  start	  with	  Leerssen’s	  definition	  of	  this	  concept:	  
I	  propose	  to	  locate	  [nationalism]	  in	  a	  tradition	  of	  ethnotypes—commonplaces	  and	  stereotypes	  of	  how	  we	  identify,	  view	  and	  charatcerize	  	  others	  as	  opposed	  to	  ourselves.	  	  In	  tracing	  the	  development	  of	  national	  thought	  and	  nationalism,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  follow,	  alongside	  the	  socio-­‐
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political	  ‘nation-­‐building’	  developments	  that	  take	  place	  in	  and	  between	  societies,	  also	  the	  discursive	  patterns	  of	  self-­‐identification,	  exoticization	  and	  characterization	  that	  take	  place	  in	  the	  field	  of	  culture	  (Leerssen	  2006:	  17).	  
As	  my	  comments	  proceed,	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  that	  much	  hinges	  on	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  relationship,	  and	  distinguish	  between,	  the	  ‘socio-­‐political’	  and	  ‘the	  field	  of	  culture’.	  	  I	  offer	  two	  lines	  of	  inquiry	  into	  this	  idea	  of	  ethnotypes.	  	  First,	  I	  ask	  whether	  we	  can	  adequately	  limit	  our	  account	  of	  evolving	  ethnotypes	  in	  Europe	  to	  the	  ideological	  universe	  of	  Europe.	  	  And	  second,	  and	  at	  more	  length,	  I	  ask	  whether	  in	  regard	  to	  nationalism,	  ethnotypes	  as	  they	  take	  shape	  after	  the	  18th	  century	  are	  really	  the	  ‘heart	  of	  the	  matter’,	  or	  perhaps	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  secondary	  effect	  of	  a	  more	  fundamental	  political	  problem,	  that	  posed	  by	  the	  revolutionary	  idea	  of	  popular	  self-­‐rule.	  
The	  scope	  of	  European	  ethnotypes:	  Leerssen’s	  project	  is	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  development	  of	  stereotypical	  ideas	  of	  national	  character	  in	  Europe.	  	  I	  want	  to	  question	  how	  much	  we	  can	  really	  demarcate	  this	  as	  a	  process	  internal	  to	  Europe.	  	  As	  already	  noted,	  among	  his	  root	  sources	  for	  this	  ideological	  process	  are	  early,	  more	  general	  divisions	  between	  the	  civilised	  and	  the	  wild,	  between	  the	  legitimate	  centres	  of	  rule,	  and	  those	  in	  the	  periphery	  (e.g.	  Ireland)	  who	  must	  be	  subordinated	  and	  brought	  under	  the	  control	  of	  civilisation	  and	  ‘proper’	  Christianity	  (Leerssen	  pp.	  25-­‐35).	  	  I	  suspect	  that	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  process	  in	  question	  is	  not	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  early	  formation,	  but	  of	  ongoing	  composition	  of	  a	  system	  of	  ethnotypes.	  	  Just	  as	  medieval	  kings	  in	  Europe	  sought	  to	  colonise	  their	  hinterlands,	  by	  the	  modern	  period	  of	  nation-­‐building,	  the	  universe	  of	  ‘colonised	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others’	  had	  been	  pushed	  out	  to	  a	  global	  arena	  of	  strange	  and	  difficult	  peoples.	  	  I	  suspect	  that	  the	  ‘typing’	  of	  Europeans	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  each	  other,	  and	  in	  regard	  to	  ‘non-­‐Europeans’	  were	  in	  a	  complex	  symbolic	  dialogue.	  	  	  
One	  indication	  of	  what	  I’m	  suggesting	  is	  found	  in	  the	  illustrations	  on	  p.	  215	  of	  the	  chapter	  on	  ‘Ethnic	  Nationalism	  and	  Racism’.	  	  There	  we	  see	  in	  parallel	  three	  posters/cartoons	  from	  the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries	  demonising,	  respectively,	  Irish,	  German	  and	  Bolshevik	  enemies	  as	  ‘ape-­‐men’,	  as	  backward,	  destructive	  forces.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  not	  to	  imagine	  that	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  symbolic	  context	  of	  these	  representations	  was	  an	  international	  race-­‐typology	  in	  which	  non-­‐European	  peoples,	  especially	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africans	  and	  their	  descendants	  in	  the	  Americas,	  were	  commonly	  likened	  to	  ‘apes’.	  	  In	  effect,	  a	  European	  discourse	  of	  national	  types	  appears	  to	  articulate	  with	  a	  long-­‐standing	  sliding	  scale	  between	  the	  civilised	  and	  the	  savage,	  the	  evolved	  and	  the	  backward,	  that	  operates	  in	  a	  transnational	  arena1.	  
Conversely,	  as	  Leerssen	  clearly	  recognises,	  the	  revalorization	  and	  codification	  of	  national	  ‘folk’	  cultures	  and	  languages	  that	  was	  so	  characteristic	  of	  central	  and	  eastern	  European	  nation-­‐building	  projects	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  (Hroch’s	  ‘phase	  A’;	  2000),	  was	  certainly	  in	  dialogue	  with	  a	  wider	  ethnographic	  impulse	  that	  reached	  well	  beyond	  Europe’s	  borders.	  	  Surely	  the	  national	  discovery	  of	  the	  native	  nobility	  and	  virtue	  of	  various	  groups	  of	  European	  peasants,	  in	  some	  sense	  replayed	  the	  romanticization	  of	  ‘primitives’	  encountered	  because	  of	  European	  colonial	  expansion,	  as	  ‘noble	  savages’.	  	  Granted	  by	  the	  19th	  century	  Europeans	  and	  European	  descended	  settler	  societies	  had	  largely	  forgotten	  the	  potential	  ‘nobility’	  of	  those	  they	  encountered	  and	  subjugated,	  and	  instead	  institutionalised	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racialist	  notions	  of	  ‘savagery’	  instead.	  	  	  But	  in	  some	  sense	  the	  ideological	  manoeuvre	  of	  revalorizing	  the	  rustic	  peoples	  had	  already	  been	  rehearsed	  in	  super-­‐European	  context,	  and	  was	  thus	  available	  for	  internal	  re-­‐application	  to	  European	  peasantries.	  
Again,	  arguments	  against	  the	  decadence,	  over-­‐refinement	  and	  despotism	  of	  various	  European	  aristocracies	  and	  their	  mode	  of	  rule	  (especially	  France),	  have	  often	  drawn	  on	  orientalist	  conceptions	  of	  decadent	  states	  and	  societies	  in	  the	  ‘east’	  (e.g.	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire).	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  difficult	  to	  draw	  a	  sharp	  line	  between	  these	  rhetorical	  ‘otherings’	  of	  non-­‐Europeans,	  and	  the	  European	  ethnotypes	  that	  Leerssen	  directs	  our	  attention	  to,	  which	  play	  on	  similar	  evaluative	  juxtapositions.	  	  Finally	  on	  this	  point,	  I	  would	  simply	  question	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  specifically	  European	  discourse	  of	  national	  identities,	  full	  stop.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere	  that	  nationalism	  in	  general	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  transatlantic	  social	  universe	  created	  by	  European	  colonial	  expansion,	  involving	  especially	  the	  rivalry	  of	  British,	  French	  and	  Spanish	  empires	  in	  the	  New	  World,	  and	  the	  interdependent	  crucial	  junctures	  of	  revolution/rebellion	  in	  the	  British	  colonies	  in	  1776	  and	  the	  French	  homeland	  in	  1789.	  	  I	  think	  the	  relevant	  universe	  of	  ideas	  and	  ideological	  interactions	  feeding	  into	  the	  idea	  of	  nations	  spanned	  the	  Atlantic,	  and	  involved	  non-­‐European	  others,	  including	  indigenous	  peoples,	  slaves	  and	  even	  such	  odd	  interstitial	  societies	  as	  pirates.	  	  I	  question	  whether	  Europe	  is	  indeed	  the	  complete	  heartland	  of	  nationalism	  (Hearn	  2009,	  see	  also	  Kramer	  2011).	  
Of	  course,	  we	  must	  sometimes	  demarcate	  boundaries	  simply	  to	  make	  investigations	  manageable,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  sense	  to	  treating	  Europe	  as	  a	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bounded	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  	  But	  my	  argument	  on	  this	  point	  is	  that	  the	  more	  one	  looks,	  the	  more	  one	  will	  find	  the	  field	  of	  ethnotypes	  analysed	  by	  Leerssen	  bleeding	  into	  a	  larger	  ideological	  field	  of	  human	  categorization.	  
The	  structural	  conditions	  stimulating	  ethnotyping?:	  My	  second	  line	  of	  questioning,	  partly	  broached	  above,	  involves	  how	  we	  conceptualise	  the	  entire	  historical	  account	  of	  modern	  nationalism,	  and	  the	  causal	  processes	  that	  underpin	  it.	  
In	  Leerssen’s	  account,	  nationalism	  is	  a	  highly	  codified	  symbolic	  system	  of	  ‘ethnotypes’,	  symbolic	  conventions	  for	  differentiating	  one’s	  nation	  from	  all	  others,	  highlighting	  its	  uniqueness,	  and	  for	  characterising	  nations	  and	  nationals	  and	  locating	  them	  within	  a	  taxonomic	  system.	  	  This	  system	  crystallizes	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  during	  the	  heyday	  of	  nation-­‐building	  in	  Europe.	  	  Contributing	  to	  its	  formation	  are	  the	  successive	  pressures	  of	  Napoleonic	  conquest	  and	  resistance,	  and	  subsequent	  adjustment	  and	  consolidation	  of	  more	  sharply	  defined	  territorial	  states.	  	  These	  provide	  the	  historical	  crucible	  out	  of	  which	  the	  system	  of	  ethnotypes	  emerges.	  	  Everything	  before	  this	  period	  is	  caste	  as	  various	  ‘source	  traditions’	  feeding	  into	  this	  coalescence,	  including	  the	  radical	  ideas	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  legitimate	  rule	  that	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  the	  18th	  century.	  	  Like	  many	  modernist	  accounts	  of	  nationalism,	  Leersen’s	  is	  19th	  century-­‐centred.	  	  	  
As	  I’ve	  already	  intimated,	  mine	  is	  an	  18th	  century-­‐centred	  account.	  	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  that	  the	  relevant	  symbolic	  universe	  of	  ‘significant	  others’	  is	  wider	  than	  Leerssen	  perhaps	  allows.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  an	  account	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  nationalism	  must	  be	  anchored	  in	  an	  account	  of	  transformations	  in	  the	  structures	  of	  rule,	  in	  the	  very	  institutions	  of	  politics,	  government,	  and	  their	  legitimation.	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And,	  that	  what	  makes	  nationalism	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  is	  the	  problematic	  positing	  of	  ‘a	  people’	  with	  a	  right	  to	  self-­‐rule.	  	  The	  attempts	  to	  substantiate	  and	  characterise	  these	  peoples,	  and	  compose	  taxonomic	  systems	  of	  such	  peoples,	  is	  a	  secondary	  effect	  of	  the	  initial	  problem	  posed:	  who	  are	  the	  people?	  (‘what	  is	  the	  third	  estate?’,	  see	  Sewell	  1994).	  The	  novel	  revolutionary	  governments	  of	  1776	  and	  1789	  were	  ideologically	  and	  practically	  compelled	  to	  enact	  systems	  of	  government	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  demos,	  a	  people,	  a	  ‘social	  contract’,	  the	  general	  will.	  	  But	  it	  is	  the	  chronic	  indeterminacy	  of	  what	  exactly	  binds	  these	  ‘peoples,	  contracts,	  wills’	  together,	  that	  has	  made	  a	  constant	  call	  to	  culture,	  ethnicity,	  or	  sometimes	  encompassing	  ideologies	  (religious	  or	  political)	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  void.	  
Profound	  historical	  transformations	  don’t	  happen	  overnight,	  not	  even	  in	  one	  or	  two	  major	  political	  revolutions.	  	  But	  these	  revolutions	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  breaking	  points	  of	  previous	  systems,	  systems	  that	  were	  explicitly	  conceived	  as,	  and	  relied	  upon,	  vast,	  over-­‐extended	  systems	  of	  patronage,	  running	  from	  monarchs	  on	  down.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  British	  colonies	  of	  North	  America	  that	  would	  become	  the	  United	  States,	  Britain	  had	  established	  colonies	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  as	  quasi-­‐self-­‐governing	  entrepreneurial	  projects	  and	  experiments	  in	  religious	  community.	  	  Bound	  to	  the	  homeland	  more	  by	  trade	  than	  by	  effective	  rule,	  developing	  their	  own	  indigenous	  patronage	  networks	  only	  loosely	  articulating	  with	  those	  of	  the	  political	  core,	  when	  material	  conflicts	  arose	  over	  taxation	  and	  covering	  the	  cost	  of	  recent	  international	  war	  with	  France,	  the	  power	  of	  patronage	  was	  too	  thin	  and	  brittle	  to	  hold	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  (see	  Wood	  1991).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  a	  sclerotic	  monarchy	  and	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aristocracy	  sat	  atop	  growing	  middling	  ranks	  that	  were	  effectively	  excluded	  from	  the	  main	  channels	  of	  patronage,	  despite	  clearly	  contributing	  as	  much	  to	  the	  life	  and	  economy	  of	  the	  country	  as	  those	  ensconced	  in	  those	  privileged	  networks.	  	  The	  added	  stress	  of	  economic	  crisis	  caused	  that	  network	  to	  snap	  and	  collapse,	  to	  be	  briefly	  replaced	  by	  the	  effervescent	  dream	  of	  pure	  demotic	  rule.	  	  	  
The	  new	  forms	  of	  popular	  democratic	  government	  that	  eventually	  took	  hold	  in	  both	  cases,	  and	  set	  the	  model	  for	  most	  subsequent	  political	  revolutions	  (Armitage	  2007),	  realised	  their	  demotic	  ambitions	  in	  limited	  ways,	  excluding	  women,	  indigenous	  peoples,	  slaves,	  and	  those	  of	  limited	  property.	  	  But	  those	  very	  exclusions	  have	  been	  problems	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  nation	  ever	  since,	  and	  gradually	  altered	  by	  the	  pressures	  of	  nation-­‐building.	  	  But	  my	  argument	  would	  be	  that	  it	  is	  the	  very	  blankness	  of	  this	  new	  canvass	  of	  political	  identity	  that	  is	  the	  crucial	  factor	  in	  the	  subsequent	  ‘filling	  in’	  of	  the	  blank	  with	  various	  ethnological	  congeries	  of	  language,	  race,	  custom	  and	  so	  on.	  	  As	  Leerssen	  so	  skilfully	  shows	  us,	  this	  will	  have	  been	  done	  not	  out	  of	  whole	  cloth,	  but	  through	  an	  artful	  elaboration	  of	  long-­‐standing	  conventions	  of	  cultural	  differentiation,	  combined	  with	  modes	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  such	  as	  philology,	  to	  build	  up	  bigger	  and	  sharper	  images	  of	  national	  character.	  
Granted	  in	  central	  and	  eastern	  Europe	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  rather	  than	  a	  response	  to	  imperial	  collapse,	  this	  ‘filling	  in’	  was	  contrived	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  end	  of	  old	  imperial	  regimes,	  or	  attempts	  to	  create	  nation-­‐states	  across	  an	  array	  of	  petty	  patronage	  systems	  (principalities)2.	  	  But	  these	  attempts	  to	  build	  the	  nation	  ‘from	  the	  other	  end’,	  in	  advance	  (while	  trying	  to	  make	  it	  look	  like	  it	  was	  always	  there	  in	  the	  form	  proposed)	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  those	  initial	  major	  ruptures	  of	  the	  18th	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century	  which	  put	  self-­‐rule	  from	  below	  by	  relatively	  large	  populations	  on	  the	  map	  of	  political	  possibilities.	  	  	  
There	  is	  no	  disagreement	  here	  between	  Leerssen	  and	  myself	  about	  the	  general	  sequence	  of	  events;	  but	  the	  crucial	  historical	  junctures,	  the	  pivots	  on	  which	  history	  turns,	  are	  identified	  and	  prioritised	  differently.	  	  He	  does	  discuss	  the	  18th	  century	  developments,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  ideas	  of	  figures	  such	  as	  Montesquieu,	  Rousseau	  and	  Sieyès	  (2006:	  71-­‐92).	  	  He	  emphasises	  in	  this	  context	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  settled	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘nation’,	  and	  the	  omnibus	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘patriot’	  for	  those	  committed	  to	  this	  new	  form	  of	  people-­‐hood	  (Smith	  2003).	  For	  me	  this	  simply	  underscores	  my	  point.	  	  These	  new	  entities	  were	  brought	  into	  being	  under	  force	  of	  circumstances	  in	  which,	  for	  the	  key	  actors,	  the	  answer	  to	  ‘who	  are	  we?’	  seemed	  relatively	  self-­‐evident.	  	  It	  is	  only	  with	  time,	  political	  consolidation,	  the	  generalisation	  of	  the	  paradigm	  as	  a	  political	  strategy,	  and	  its	  invocation	  in	  fundamentally	  different	  political	  situations,	  that	  ‘patriot’	  begins	  to	  need	  the	  support	  of	  something	  more	  essentialising,	  more	  rooted	  in	  place	  and	  culture.	  	  I	  would	  also	  note	  in	  passing	  that	  these	  essentialised	  notions	  of	  national	  identity	  based	  on	  language,	  race	  and	  culture	  are	  not	  the	  only	  means	  of	  filling	  in	  the	  blank	  of	  the	  overly-­‐theoretical	  demos.	  	  Fundamentalist	  brands	  of	  religion	  and	  political	  ideology	  have	  also	  served,	  and	  continue	  to	  serve,	  this	  purpose.	  	  
It	  is	  perhaps	  telling	  that	  in	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  book	  where	  Leerssen	  begins	  to	  look	  forward	  to	  a	  time	  after	  the	  historical	  storms	  of	  nationalism,	  that	  he	  invokes	  Ernst	  Renan	  as	  a	  calmer	  voice	  of	  reason,	  rejecting	  racial	  and	  linguistic	  essentialisms	  of	  his	  day,	  and	  instead	  characterising	  the	  nation	  as	  an	  historically	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formed	  ‘daily	  plebiscite’	  (2006:	  227-­‐35).	  	  This	  appears	  to	  begin	  to	  point	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  darkness,	  a	  path	  that	  seems	  to	  lead	  toward	  Habermas	  in	  subsequent	  pages.	  	  But	  as	  Leerssen	  himself	  notes,	  Renan’s	  famous	  essay	  points	  back	  to	  that	  original	  18th	  century	  conception	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  self-­‐determining	  demos,	  and	  while	  it	  may	  point	  to	  a	  way	  out,	  I	  think	  it	  also	  points	  back	  to	  the	  most	  significant	  origins	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  have	  one	  minor	  quibble	  with	  the	  passing	  representation	  of	  monogenism	  and	  polygenism	  on	  p.211.	  	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  entrenched,	  supposedly	  scientific	  ideas	  of	  deep	  biological	  difference	  between	  ‘races’	  persists	  through	  the	  19th	  century	  and	  well	  into	  the	  20th	  century,	  prior	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  The	  Origin	  of	  
Species,	  the	  biblical	  account	  had	  offered	  the	  main	  support	  for	  monogenecist	  beliefs,	  while	  the	  pseudo-­‐sciences	  of	  biological	  race	  tended	  to	  support	  polygenicism.	  	  The	  irony	  of	  Darwin’s	  theory	  is	  that	  provided	  an	  alternate	  monogenecist	  explanation	  that	  dispensed	  with	  the	  biblical	  account	  and	  made	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  zoological	  data	  (see	  Stepan	  1982,	  esp.	  ch	  4).	  
2	  And	  of	  course	  one	  version	  of	  the	  Sonderweg	  thesis	  in	  regard	  to	  Germany	  is	  that	  it	  was	  in	  part	  the	  failure	  to	  fully	  displace	  an	  older	  military-­‐aristocratic	  ethos	  of	  power	  patronage	  with	  a	  full-­‐blown	  idea	  of	  demos	  that	  led	  to	  the	  disaster	  of	  fascism,	  a	  true	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  only	  really	  forming	  after	  1945	  (cf.	  Elias	  1996,	  Wolf	  1999:	  197-­‐273).	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